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The Unique Economic Policy Environment of 
Interwar and Postwar America 
Michael A. Bernstein* 
Significant transformations in the economic policy 
environment in the United States have almost always been the 
exclusive product of significant turmoil, conflict, and war.  Within 
the crucible of open rebellion, Abraham Lincoln struggled to 
develop an altogether unique set of fiscal, financial, and 
procurement practices that served both to further federal 
objectives in the Civil War and forever reorient the role and 
impact of central government in the nation’s economic life.1  It is 
clear that the Lincoln government felt compelled to take 
extraordinary action with respect to civil liberties, judicial due-
process, and civil rights in defense of the Union.  Similarly, its 
Treasury and War Departments implemented unprecedented 
economic policies in pursuit of military victory and the resolute 
winning of the peace that would follow.2  The economic practices 
thus deployed—most importantly, the imposition of income and 
excise taxation, the establishment of a national banking system, 
and the issuance of paper money—forever changed Washington’s 
presence in the macroeconomy3 and they yielded results that 
were powerfully and uniquely tied to the political, commercial, 
and social circumstances of their day.4  Quite similarly, almost a 
century later, another unique set of political and economic 
contexts emerged in American history that would set the stage 
for another dramatic and vastly consequential change in the 
policymaking practices of the nation’s government.  Pondering 
those quite special circumstances, spanning the period from the 
Great Depression of the twentieth century through the height of 
 
* Departments of History and Economics and Office of Academic Affairs and 
Provost, Tulane University. 
 1  See generally Robert D. Hormats, Abraham Lincoln and the Global Economy, 
HARV. BUS. REV., August 2003, at 60. 
 2  See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR & RECONSTRUCTION 
374–83 (1982); see also Stanley L. Engerman, The Economic Impact of the Civil War, 3 
EXPLORATIONS ENTREPRENEURIAL HIST. 176, 176–99 (2d. ser. 1966). 
 3  ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, 
at 22–23 (1988). 
 4  See BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS & POLITICS IN 
THE CIVIL WAR 202–07, 226–29, 232–35 (1970). 
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the Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union and its allied states, 
sets the events and outcomes of the Lincoln era in sharp relief 
while also affording a better appreciation of the forces that have 
shaped late twentieth century American experience.  While the 
following derives primarily from several prior works, the content 
remains relevant to this discussion of constitutional approaches 
to wartime finance and economics, both in the context of the Civil 
War and today’s War on Terror.5 
America’s greatest depression was not brought to an end by 
inspired policy choices.  Far from it.  World War II achieved what 
the New Deal could not.  National unemployment fell to only 7 
percent by the time of the Japanese naval offensive in the 
Hawaiian and Aleutian Islands.  America’s formal entry into the 
conflict brought almost instantaneous resolution of the nation’s 
persistent economic difficulties.  A wholly collectivized and 
centralized approach—through rationing, price controls, and 
federal allocative planning—provided for the kind of reflation 
and economic recovery that had seemed so unattainable during 
the worst years of the Great Depression itself.  When 
unemployment fell to just over one percent in the last year of the 
war, it was clear that, while hardly inspired by specific economic 
concerns, President Franklin Roosevelt’s “arsenal of democracy” 
nevertheless contained rather vivid policy lessons for economists, 
politicians, government officials, and the public at large.6 
New Deal recovery policy has generally been seen as beset by 
a fundamental contradiction between two strategies.  That 
contradiction was epitomized by the conflict between the 
advocates of economic planning within Roosevelt’s inner circle 
who celebrated the efficiency and rationality of large-scale 
enterprise, and those committed to trust-busting, who 
maintained that excessive concentrations of market power in 
major sectors of the economy had caused the economic crisis of 
the thirties.  The result of the contradiction was the strange brew 
of New Deal economic policy, the bewildering movement of the 
president from a planning initiative to a reform initiative 
 
 5  The following, with the exception of the conclusion, is excerpted from MICHAEL A. 
BERNSTEIN, A PERILOUS PROGRESS: ECONOMISTS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE IN TWENTIETH 
CENTURY AMERICA 74 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001); MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION: DELAYED RECOVERY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1929-1939, at 186 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1987); UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE 15 
(Michael A. Bernstein & David E. Adler, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); Michael A. 
Bernstein, A Brief History of the American Economic Association, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 
1007 (2008). 
 6  MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, A PERILOUS PROGRESS: ECONOMISTS AND PUBLIC 
PURPOSE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 74 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter 
PERILOUS PROGRESS]. 
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agenda, and the generally poor record of Roosevelt’s first two 
terms with respect to economic recovery.7 
Ever the consummate strategist, Roosevelt evaluated 
economic policy proposals primarily with reference to electoral 
and political impacts, far less with convictions concerning the 
logical coherence or intellectual (not to mention professional) 
pedigree of the argument.  As a result, his economic decisions 
tended to be skittish, sometimes timid, and often unpredictable.  
Federal government vacillation between the imposition of a 
centralized blueprint for recovery, as exemplified by the 
Industrial Codes of the National Recovery Administration, and 
the prosecution of antitrust tactics to foster a competitive revival 
never ceased.  Fiscal spending targets were more often than not 
simply too low to do the job, and their allotment was driven as 
much by hardheaded projections of their influence in the 
electoral college as by closely measured multiplier effects on 
consumption and investment.8 
Consumption and investment behavior played a major part 
in the great prosperity of the late forties and fifties.  On the 
domestic side, reconversion was itself an investment stimulus.  
Modernization and deferred replacement projects required 
renewed and large deployments of funds.  Profound scarcities of 
consumer goods, the production of which had been long 
postponed by mobilization needs, necessitated major retooling 
and expansion efforts.  Even fear of potentially high inflation, 
emerging in the wake of the dismantling of the price and wage 
controls of the war years, prompted many firms to move forward 
the date of ambitious and long-term investment projects.  On the 
foreign side, both individuals and governments were eager to find 
a refuge for capital that had been in virtual hiding during the 
war itself.  Along with a jump in domestic investment, therefore, 
a large capital inflow began in the United States in late 1945 and 
early 1946.9 
Domestic consumption was the second major component of 
postwar growth.  Bridled demand and high household savings 
due to wartime shortages, rationing, and controls, coupled with 
the generous wage rates of the high-capacity war economy all 
contributed to a dramatic growth in consumer spending at war’s 
end.  The jump in disposable income was bolstered by the rapid 
 
 7  MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: DELAYED RECOVERY AND 
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1929-1939, at 186 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1987) 
[hereinafter GREAT DEPRESSION]. 
 8  PERILOUS PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 76. 
 9  UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE 15 (Michael A. Bernstein & 
David E. Adler eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). 
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reduction in wartime surtaxes and excises that had been a 
central part of the federal government’s strategy of war finance.  
And the baby boom of the wartime generation expressed itself 
economically in high levels of demand for significant items like 
appliances, automobiles, and housing.  G.I. Bill benefits 
additionally served to increase the demand for housing and such 
things as educational services with associated impacts on 
construction and other bellwether sectors.10 
Foreign demand for the American exports grew rapidly in 
the immediate postwar years.  In part the needs of devastated 
areas could only be met by the one industrial base that had been 
nearly untouched by war-related destruction.  Explicit policy 
commitments to the rebuilding of allied and occupied territories, 
such as the Marshall Plan in Europe, also served to increase the 
foreign market for the output of American industry.  Even so, one 
of the most powerful influences on the impressive postwar 
growth of the American economy was the unique and special set 
of arrangements developed for international trade at the 
Monetary and Financial Conference of the United Nations in 
1944.  Along with the creation of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (known today as the World 
Bank) and the International Monetary Fund, the Conference 
decided to establish fixed exchange rates between the U.S. dollar 
and all other internationally traded currencies.  The value of the 
dollar was itself set in terms of gold at $35 per ounce.  This 
installed a benchmark against which the value of all other 
currencies was measured.  American postwar prosperity and the 
benefits of world economic leadership continued throughout most 
of the 1950s.  The added fiscal stimulus of the Korean War also 
played a role in maintaining the high levels of growth and 
employment characteristic of the decade.11 
Federal research expenditures had increased more than 
tenfold between 1938 and 1944, from $68 million to $706 million 
per year.12  As Clark Kerr of the University of California had so 
accurately and succinctly implied some years later, what had 
been the “Land Grant College” funding strategies of the 
nineteenth century gave way to the “Federal Grant University” 
systems of the twentieth.13  Further stimulated by Russia’s 
successful test of an atomic bomb in September 1949 (and of a 
“super” or “hydrogen” bomb in the summer of 1953), the coming 
of war in the Korean peninsula the following year, and such 
 
 10  Id. at 15–16. 
 11  Id. at 16. 
 12  PERILOUS PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 100. 
 13  Id. at 102. 
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challenges to America’s aeronautical capabilities as the orbiting 
of a Russian earth satellite (the Sputnik) in October 1957, 
government support of science and engineering became the basis 
of yet a new (and more powerful) “arsenal of democracy.”14 
High rates of growth, robust levels of employment, and 
stable prices were the standards by which a capitalist society 
could demonstrate its advantages over command economies 
premised upon socialist or communist designs.  As the 
emblematic “Kitchen Debate” between Soviet premier Nikita 
Khrushchev and Vice President Richard Nixon had suggested in 
1959, winning the cold war involved more than husbanding a 
credible nuclear deterrent, deploying fleets, garrisons, and air 
wings around the world, and utilizing special forces in 
counterinsurgency campaigns.  It also required that an economic 
system deliver the goods to the people.  Prosperity was an 
essential weapon in the struggle for the hearts and minds of any 
society. 
A vigorous national economy was thus essential both to 
equip the armed forces and to demonstrate the virtues of 
American capitalism.  Guns and butter were the protocol; a “New 
Economics” could provide the means to that end.  Both the 
experience of the Great Depression and the challenges of world 
war had made clear to a new generation of specialists that the 
public sector occupied a crucial niche in the mechanisms of the 
national economy.  Properly managed and monitored, the 
macroeconomy not only would provision an appropriate quantity 
and quality of public goods on its own behalf but also would 
afford the private sector the wherewithal to expand output 
targets, enhance productivity, and maintain employment.  
Interweaving public and private accumulation strategies, 
reckoning with the “mixed economy” of the postwar era, denoted 
the ascendancy of what was arguably the defining characteristic 
of the arguments of John Maynard Keynes.  Independent of 
specific policy initiatives, Keynesianism represented a new way 
of thinking about the economy as a whole, one that dovetailed 
with broader governmental objectives tied to the struggle against 
Communism.  Whatever the intellectual foundations of the 
“Keynesian revolution,” its historical moorings were made fast by 
the exigencies of the Cold War.15 
Recapturing the presidency and the Congress in the election 
of 1952 encouraged many Grand Old Party stalwarts in the belief 
that the potent Democratic influence of two decades had, at long 
 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. at 107. 
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last, come to an end.  Whatever the tenuous nature of their 
control on Capitol hill—one seat in the Senate, nine seats in the 
House of Representatives—and despite the ideological 
moderation of the Dwight Eisenhower, whose national popularity 
had prompted some of his champions to indulge fantasies of a 
bipartisan presidential endorsement, Republicans viewed with 
satisfaction the imminent opportunity to dismantle the most 
objectionable manifestations of the New Deal and the Fair Deal.  
The blurring of party differences wrought by the beginnings of 
the Cold War, the marginalization of the Right by the victory of 
the Grand Alliance over fascism, the suppression of the Left by 
the gathering momentum of McCarthyism—all this emboldened 
the enemies of federal economic intervention, primarily but not 
solely Republicans, to settle accounts.16 
To be sure, the run-up to the 1952 campaign had been an 
occasion for spirited and, at times, hot-tempered debate within 
the major parties themselves.  Supporters of Senator Robert Taft 
of Ohio refused to make Eisenhower’s nomination unanimous at 
the Republican national convention in Chicago.  Harry Truman’s 
decision to step down sparked a struggle for power among the 
Democrats as well—the wounds of the “Dixiecrat” rebellion still 
festering after the party’s improbable victory in 1948.  The 
president’s choice of Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson as his 
successor eased tensions in the four-way race for the nomination 
that emerged between Averell Harriman (governor of New York), 
Estes Kefauver (senator from Tennessee), Richard Russell 
(senator from Georgia), and Stevenson himself.  But in the final 
analysis, on election day, Eisenhower’s thirty-three million votes, 
then the largest popular tally in a presidential canvass, signaled 
what some pundits referred to as “the revolt of the moderates” 
and the start of what the president-elect himself hoped would be 
a “Second Era of Good Feelings.”  No matter how the 1952 
returns were read, it was clear that, in the wake of Roosevelt’s 
reconfiguration of his party, one of the great transformations of 
American political history had taken hold: on the one side, the 
party of Jefferson, the defender of states’ rights and localism, had 
in short order become the champion of federal authority and 
centralized power; on the other, the party born of the nineteenth-
century crisis of the Union, the vanguard of a modern 
administrative state, stood as a resolute critic of Washington’s 
increasing presence in almost every aspect of the nation’s life.17 
Unlike any other industrialized nation in the world at the 
 
 16  Id. at 115. 
 17  Id. at 115–16. 
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time, the United States met the 1950’s with an economy not only 
physically intact but also organizationally and technologically 
robust.  The demographic echoes of war set the stage for 
acceleration in the rate of population growth, while the labor 
market effects of demobilization surprisingly sparked a rise in 
wages and incomes.  Rapid and profitable conversion to domestic 
production was further engrossed by foreign demand—most 
vividly and poignantly emanating from those regions most 
devastated by the war itself—for the products of American 
industry and agriculture.  As for international finance, the nation 
stood as creditor virtually to the entire world, and the dollar, 
both by default and by the multilateral agreement first reached 
by the Allied nations at Bretton Woods, had become a kind of 
numeraire to a newly emergent system of global commerce.  With 
no small justification, the fifties and sixties would come to be 
regarded as a golden age of American capitalism.18 
Macroeconomic management, demanding under any 
circumstances, was made substantially easier for a postwar 
generation that found itself the beneficiaries of historical 
circumstance.  Far from solving the cruel puzzle of idle capacity 
and widespread unemployment that had characterized the Great 
Depression, and unlike the challenge to rationalize allocation and 
maximize production in the emergency of war, the task that lay 
before American economists by the mid-1950s was both more 
straightforward and less difficult.  More straightforward because, 
thanks to both the “Keynesian revolution” in economic thought 
and the policy experience derived from mobilization and war, the 
relationship between individual market behavior and aggregate 
outcomes was finally subject to systematic understanding.  Less 
difficult because, given the sturdy rebound of the economy in the 
wake of World War II, there existed both the confidence (most 
especially exemplified by the moderate rates of return in the 
markets for Treasury bills and other government obligations) and 
the means (most vividly represented by rising income tax 
receipts) to realize fiscal spending targets with a minimum of 
redistributive implications.19  Indeed, so optimistic were 
politicians and the vast majority of economists concerning the 
effectiveness of stabilization policy techniques that it became 
fashionable by the early 1960s to speak of the “end of the 
business cycle.”20 
 
 18  Id. at 117–18. 
 19  Id. at 118. 
 20  Michael A. Bernstein, A Brief History of the American Economic Association, 67 
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 1007, 1019 (2008). 
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A remarkably prosperous decade in the United States, the 
1950s were nevertheless punctuated by three recessions.  
Relatively brief and mild, these downturns stood as a sturdy 
challenge to mainstream macroeconomists who believed that a 
new learning could make such fluctuations a thing of the past.  
They also assumed, especially in the case of the last slump 
(which occurred right on the eve of the 1960 presidential 
campaign), a growing significance in the minds of politicians 
eager to “score points” in electoral contests that had been, at 
least since the thirty-fourth president’s reelection in 1956, fairly 
tame.  For Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy in the very 
closely contested presidential race of 1960, tarring his opponent, 
Vice President Richard Nixon, with the brush of the 1959 
recession was a useful and ultimately successful, if decidedly 
opportunistic, tactic.21 
Faced with an economy the insipid performance of which had 
left the unemployment rate around seven percent, the new 
administration in Washington was also discomfited by middling 
productivity gains in the nation’s workplaces that now weakened 
America’s international trade position.  What had been almost 
two decades of unchallenged national supremacy in world 
markets, a circumstance both facilitated and recognized by the 
Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, could no longer be sustained 
in the face of the revitalization of the economies of Western 
Europe and Japan.  As they reestablished their international 
economic presence, nations like the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Japan exploited the advantages of an advanced technological 
base that was the outgrowth of the recent rebuilding of their 
major industries.  Ironically enough, they also thrived because of 
their relative insulation, under international treaties and 
protocols (exemplified by the erection of a “nuclear umbrella” by 
the United States to forestall what was feared to be the potential 
for Soviet and Chinese aggression), from the burdens of defense 
spending.  Consequentially, their major manufacturing sectors—
such as automobiles, electronics, and steel—became powerful 
competitors with their American counterparts.  Whatever the 
concerns of President Kennedy’s advisors with the domestic 
weaknesses of the national economy, the international context 
within which these difficulties emerged could not be ignored.22 
Given these fairly stark international realities, it was hardly 
surprising that some of the most powerful policy makers in the 
Kennedy government sought to frame the nation’s economic 
 
 21  PERILOUS PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 130–31. 
 22  Id. at 132–33. 
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challenges with respect to global financial networks.  Both 
Treasury secretary Douglas Dillon and his undersecretary for 
monetary affairs, Robert Roosa, regarded the growing imbalance 
between imports and exports, and the potential drain on national 
gold stocks of which it warned, to be the defining economic policy 
problem of the New Frontier.  In this assessment they were 
joined by William McChesney Martin, chair of the Federal 
Reserve System Board of Governors.  As a central banker, Martin 
was further troubled by the inflationary bias that any 
deterioration in the value of the dollar (and thus in its “buying 
power”) would engender.  Both Treasury and the Fed were thus 
of like mind that relatively high interest rates were, by late 1961 
and early 1962, a desirable and appropriate goal of 
administration economic policy.23 
For President Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisers, 
however, no matter how customary and venerable the medicine, 
the proposed monetary cure was worse than the fiscal disease.  
The debate over the proper “mix” of fiscal and monetary policy 
during the Kennedy administration would become emblematic of 
national policy discussions through the remainder of the century.  
Late in 1961, the members of the CEA began to formulate a plan 
to bring unemployment down to the four percent level.  In their 
view, the most efficient and politically expedient method to reach 
that target was through an income tax cut.  An annual 
macroeconomic growth target of five percent had been made part 
of the party’s convention platform at Los Angeles.24 
For this purpose, lead presidential economic advisor Walter 
Heller’s adroit skill in rendering policy argument as graceful 
prose linked up well with his colleague James Tobin’s sharply 
honed analytical instincts.  Turning to another White House staff 
economist Arthur Okun, Tobin asked his former Yale colleague to 
estimate, if possible, the relationship between the level of 
unemployment and the magnitude of the gross national product.  
Out of that statistical protocol emerged “Okun’s Law,” a rather 
straightforward calculation which showed that for every one 
percent reduction in unemployment there could be garnered 
(through direct impacts on levels of output and indirect 
reductions in the “underemployment” of contracted labor in slack 
times) a three percent increase in national product.25  In 
President Kennedy, Heller and his colleagues found a 
sympathetic student of the New Economics, nervous all the same 
 
 23  Id. at 133. 
 24  Id. at 133–34. 
 25  Id. at 134. 
BERNSTEIN 10/14/2009 7:03 PM 
558 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:549 
about its political implications; in William Martin of the Federal 
Reserve System, and, to a lesser extent, Douglas Dillon at 
Treasury, they encountered more problematic skeptics.  The 
timidity of his first budget message to the Congress 
notwithstanding, the president had refrained from asking for a 
tax increase to supplement additional military expenditures 
(between $3 and $4 billon) in the wake of the Berlin crisis.26  
Taking the measure of the naysayers at Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve Board had, by contrast, less to do with 
persuasive argumentation premised on scholarly credentials 
than with straightforward and hardheaded struggles for the 
president’s ear.  By far, Douglas Dillon was the easier opponent 
for the New Frontiersmen of the Kennedy Administration.  A 
lone Republican in a Democratic cabinet, his freedom of 
maneuver was already quite constrained.  More to the point, so 
profound was the mutual admiration between Heller and 
Undersecretary Roosa that the Kennedy Council enjoyed special 
access to the highest echelons in the Treasury building.27 
Federal Reserve Board Chair William McChesney Martin 
had neither the political obligations to President Kennedy nor 
the official responsibilities to the executive branch that 
constrained the conduct of Secretary of Treasury Dillon.  The 
“independence” of the Fed from the executive branch was the 
result of both conscious intent in its founding legislation and 
decades of practice among a Board of Governors whose 
sensibilities were more attuned to the needs of the nation’s 
banking industry than anything else.  Martin had refused, 
contrary to the traditional script, to offer his resignation to the 
new president.  By early 1963 the president encouraged his 
Council of Economic Advisors to prepare, for inclusion in his 1963 
budget message, the formal tax-cut proposal so long debated and 
which he believed the Fed (in the person of its chair, now 
comforted by his renewed term and authority) would, if not 
endorse, simply tolerate.  Its ultimate legacy was the Revenue 
Act of 1964.  Peacetime deficit spending as an explicit growth 
policy of the federal government had finally come home.28 
Federal intervention in the national economy, both in the 
mid-nineteenth and late twentieth centuries, was the product of 
unique circumstances tied to serious and threatening 
developments both within and beyond the nation’s borders.  The 
very contexts within which powerful and unprecedented 
 
 26  Id. at 135. 
 27  Id. at 135–36 
 28  Id. at 136. 
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manipulation of economic outcomes by the national government 
made sense were themselves the product of singular forces of 
historical change, armed conflict, geopolitical struggle, and 
ideological contestation.  For particular generations of 
Americans, the responsibility of the national government to take 
decisive steps to influence market outcomes was forged in these 
critical epochs—years during which the nation was tested, 
reconfigured, and ultimately strengthened.  For all these reasons, 
it seems (and seemed) obvious to many that economic policy 
lessons thus learned in grave moments could then be generalized 
and universally applied.  Even so, it is the unfortunate reality of 
history that its lessons are rarely straightforward, and its 
implications become complex riddles that often take generations 
to unravel.  As vividly demonstrated by the profound difficulty of 
simply applying the jurisprudence of the Lincoln years to the 
present-day War on Terrorism, the economic policy practices of 
the mid to late twentieth century are clearly not directly 
applicable to the exceptional challenges occasioned by the Great 
Crash of 2008.  Even so, by appreciating their exceptional 
qualities, we are warned off of simplistic (and dangerous) 
decisions—and we are reminded that, in facing dilemmas both 
vexing and unnerving, our generation is hardly alone. 
 
